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nderstanding distributive justice norms is important for both nor-
mative and empirical research across political science and other dis-
ciplines. “What is justice?” has been a central question in politi-
cal and moral theory for over two millennia. “Is it just?” is a question poli-
ticians, policy makers, and citizens face in deciding how to distribute ben-
efi ts and burdens in society. Finally, the question “What do people be-
lieve is just?” interests researchers who study political behavior and atti-
tudes. The legitimacy of the state and its leaders depends in large measure 
on their perceived justice (Weatherford 1992; Alwin, Gornev, and Khakhu-
lina 1995), and legislation and public policy are judged in terms of their 
procedural and distributive justice (Rasinski 1987; Tyler et al. 1997). 
Despite the importance of understanding distributive justice across all 
areas of social inquiry, a gap remains between normative and empirical ap-
proaches. Normative researchers tend to view empirical fi ndings as irrele-
vant for their work. In response, Elster (1995) suggests that philosophical the-
ories contradicted by experimental and other evidence are open to question. 
For their part, empirical researchers often focus on instrumental theories and 
downplay normative considerations. Justice research nonetheless shows that 
while self-interest is undoubtedly a factor in behavior, normative beliefs also 
matter (Tyler et al. 1997). Miller articulates the relevance of theoretically in-
formed experimental research into distributive justice norms: the social sci-
entist “needs a normative theory both to enable him to distinguish beliefs and 
pieces of behavior that express justice from those that do not, and to explain 
such beliefs and behavior adequately” (1999,59). 
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Abstract: We present a theoreti-
cally Informed experimental study 
of distributive justice norms con-
cerning income distribution. Our 
study consists of three related ex-
periments that examine how indi-
viduals use four distinct allocation 
principles derived from both nor-
mative and empirical research—
equality, merit, need, and effi cien-
cy—under a condition of impartial-
ity. Our experiments are designed 
to investigate these principles and 
to determine how independent fac-
tors infl uence how individuals use 
them. We fi nd that individuals tend 
to use all or most of these princi-
ples simultaneously in making dis-
tributive justice judgments, but that 
they weigh them differently accord-
ing to various factors. In particular, 
we fi nd an expectedly strong dif-
ference between how women and 
men use and weigh these principles. 
This gender difference parallels—
and may even underlie—the gender 
gap observed in political and policy 
preferences. 
U
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Most research into distributive justice norms in po-
litical science has been done through public opinion sur-
veys or interviews. This research often seems to show 
that individuals have confl icting views concerning jus-
tice (Lane 1962; Hochshild 1981; McClosky and Zaller 
1984; Verba and Orren 1985; Kluegel and Smith 1986; 
Verba et al. 1987; Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995). 
Reviewing the experimental and theoretical literature, 
Miller argues (1991, 377), however, that people may 
have complex rather than confl icting views on justice 
(see Hochshild 1981). Experimental research reveals 
that distributive justice judgments usually involve sev-
eral distinct allocation principles. This research further 
shows that several factors infl uence how individuals use 
these principles, including what good is being distribut-
ed, the context of the distribution, and the individuals’ 
particular characteristics, such as gender, culture, ideolo-
gy, and socio-economic status. (For overviews, see Mill-
er 1999; Törnblom 1992; Elster 1995; Tyler et al. 1997; 
Hegtvedt and Cook 1999). 
We offer a theoretically informed experimental study 
of distributive justice norms concerning income distribu-
tion that examines both allocation principles themselves 
and the factors that affect how individuals use them. 
We investigate four allocation principles derived from 
both normative and empirical research-equality, merit, 
need, and effi ciency-and examine how they are related 
to one another. We test how individuals use these allo-
cation principles under the condition of impartiality, fol-
lowing a long tradition linking justice and impartiality 
(see Rawls 1971, Barry 1995). Our study builds on two 
recent studies of judgments of income distribution, the 
fi rst by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) and the sec-
ond by Mitchell et al. (1993). Both studies show that in-
dividuals consider multiple principles and make trad-
eoffs among them, but they confl ict as to which princi-
ples are involved. One of our aims is to make sense of 
these apparently contradictory results. Second, we ex-
amine how independent factors such as gender and ide-
ology affect how individuals use these principles. In or-
der to do so, we create more precise measures of partici-
pants’ use of these principles and use a much larger sam-
ple size than previous studies. 
We begin by discussing the four major allocation 
principles found in the normative research on distribu-
tive justice. Second, we review the relevant experimen-
tal research. Third, we present our own experimental de-
sign and theoretical predictions. Fourth, we present our 
results. Finally, we discuss our results concerning the al-
location principles and the factors that infl uence how in-
dividuals use them. We take special note of an unexpect-
ed gender difference in how women and men apply al-
location principles and conclude by speaking to the rel-
evance of our results for justice research and other areas 
of political science. 
Allocation Principles in Normative Theory
From Aristotle to Rawls, philosophers have formulat-
ed different theories of distributive justice. The apparent 
disagreement over what is “just” or “fair” within philos-
ophy nonetheless obscures a more important consensus 
over a small number of distinct allocation principles. We 
have identifi ed four analytically distinct allocation prin-
ciples in our review of the normative and empirical liter-
ature: equality, merit, need, and effi ciency. Different the-
ories of distributive justice can be categorized by which 
allocation principles they emphasize and how they con-
ceptualize the relationship among them. For example, 
Rawls (1971) takes a “constructivist” approach that of-
fers a theory of how individuals would lexically order 
these principles under a condition of “fairness” or im-
partiality. Other theorists adopt a pluralist approach that 
builds on an intuition that individuals use these princi-
ples simultaneously and make tradeoffs among them 
(Miller 1999) or that they weigh them differently in dif-
ferent “spheres” (Walzer 1983). Our aim is to draw on 
the normative literature to defi ne these principles for 
systematic study. 
Equality 
The close relationship between equality and justice has 
been recognized since the beginnings of political phi-
losophy. Aristotle indicates this kinship when he takes 
advantage of the fact that the same Greek word (isos) 
means both “fair” and “equal.” “And so if what is unjust 
is unfair, what is just is fair [or: equal], as seems true 
to everyone even without argument” (1985, 123). While 
Aristotle emphasizes proportional equality between mer-
it and reward, modern justice theories tend to disassoci-
ate equality and merit by conceiving of equality in an 
absolute sense. The norm of equality has been progres-
sively expanded from arguments for equality of rights to 
equality of conditions (Dahl 1989). Equality remains the 
presumptive principle in nearly all modern theories of 
justice, as well as a central norm in debates over democ-
racy, the social welfare state, and the distribution of in-
come and other goods (Weale 1985). considerable dis-
agreements over just what equality means remain (see 
Rae 1981, Sen 1992, ix, 12–16), but we will operational-
ize the principle as absolute equality of outcome. 
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Merit
Despite the centrality of equality, most justice theo-
ries acknowledge other allocation principles that are po-
tentially in tension with equality, notably merit. Merit re-
quires that goods be distributed in proportion to contri-
bution where that contribution is due to qualities or ac-
tivities thought to “deserve” reward. Since contribution 
is usually unequal, merit is most often a justifi cation for 
inequality. The idea of merit as proportionate equality 
has its roots in Aristotle’s theory of proportional equal-
ity, or “equity.” Merit claims have been questioned re-
cently, most notably by Rawls, who argues that income 
outcomes based on effort and ability should be consid-
ered “arbitrary from a moral point of view” (1971, 15). 
Critics of Rawls and others nonetheless continue to ar-
gue that merit is a legitimate allocation principle (e.g., 
Sandel 1982; Sher 1987; Miller 1999). Moreover, em-
pirical research shows people clearly do consider mer-
it in making allocation judgments (Miller 1999, 63–73). 
Miller argues (1999, 66) the aspects of contribution that 
can be considered as “deserving” reward can be reduced 
to ability, effort, and performance. Since effort and abil-
ity are the normatively relevant determinants of perfor-
mance, we consider merit in terms of effort and ability. 
Need 
If merit justifi es departing from an equal distribution, 
need is often invoked as a principle to limit inequali-
ties. For example, Boulding (1962) argues there is a ten-
sion between “desert” and a “social minimum.” Need is 
closely related to equality, and equal need can be a cri-
terion for equal distribution. A number of theories none-
theless treat need as a distinct allocation principle (see 
Miller 1999, 203–230). A similar tension might exist 
between need and effi ciency, which justifi es inequali-
ty based on the aggregate benefi ts. For example, Locke 
suggests that need places a limit on the inequality stem-
ming from the exercise of property rights ([1689] 1988, 
292–293). The principle of need as a “social minimum” 
has strongly infl uenced contemporary social democratic 
thought and social welfare programs in the United States 
and elsewhere (Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey 1990). 
The concepts of need and relative deprivation have 
been developed in welfare economics as important ele-
ments in the analysis of income distribution (especial-
ly Sen 1992, 1997)) but there has been little systemat-
ic development of need as a normative principle (Bray-
brooke 1987). This lack of theoretical development may 
be due in part to the strong conceptual relationship be-
tween need and equality, especially when need is con-
ceived of as relative rather than absolute. Since one of 
the aims of our experiment is to test the distinctness of 
need and equality, we consider need in absolute terms as 
a minimum level of necessary social goods. 
Effi ciency 
Effi ciency is another allocation principle used to justify 
inequalities in terms of aggregate benefi t (Locke [1688] 
1988; Schumpeter 1947; Friedman 1963). While not 
strictly speaking a normative principle in itself, effi ciency 
is used to justify the fairness of inequalities and therefore 
raises a normative consideration in allocation judgments. 
There is a tension between claims for economic effi cien-
cy and the strong claim to equality. Rawls terms (1971, 
36, 44) this tradeoff the “aggregative-distributive dichot-
omy,” while Okun (1975) makes it the centerpiece of his 
work. Many theorists reject merit as a legitimate justifi -
cation of inequality, but defend inequalities as legitimate 
when based upon effi ciency (Nozick 1974; Okun 1975; 
Hayek 1976). We use the term “effi ciency” to mean that 
a greater amount of overall goods for the same amount of 
input is preferred (see Sen 1992, especially 6–8)) or what 
is sometimes termed “wealth maximization” (Plattner 
1979, 43–44; Posner 1981). (“Effi ciency” as we opera-
tionalize it does not meet the Pareto optimality condition, 
but it is consistent with the Kaldor-Hicks principle.) Our 
research is designed to explore the relationship between 
effi ciency and the other allocation principles. 
Experimental Research on 
Distributive Justice 
The allocation principles we identify in the normative 
literature are also central to experimental research on 
distributive justice. Experimental research over the past 
fi fty years, principally in psychology, has been charac-
terized by a shift to a pluralist framework based on fi nd-
ings that individuals use several allocation principles 
in distributive justice judgments. Early research con-
centrated on equity theory, which conceived distribu-
tive justice in terms of the proportion of inputs and out-
puts from an interaction (e.g., Adams 1965; Messick and 
Cook 1983). The pluralist approach was inspired large-
ly by Deutsch, who argues (1975, 1985) that equity re-
search confl ates distinct allocation principles. Most sub-
sequent research has settled upon a limited number of al-
location principles, although terminological inconsisten-
cy and theoretical incompleteness continues to impede 
both progress and communication. Deutsch (1975) iden-
tifi es three distinct principles: equity, equality, and need. 
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What he means by “equity” is the desire for higher ag-
gregate outputs, or “effi ciency” in our terminology. Sim-
ilarly, Schwinger (1980) studies contribution, equality, 
and need, but by “contribution” he means deserts pro-
portional to contribution, or “merit” in our usage. A sim-
ilar pluralist approach can be seen in other empirical re-
search into distributive justice. For instance, the study of 
public opinion on justice issues conducted by the Inter-
national Social Justice Program in twelve countries fi nds 
principles roughly similar to those we have discussed 
through factor analysis of survey responses (Swift et al. 
1995). Finally, Sen (1997, 15–18, 77, 91) utilizes these 
same principles in his research on welfare economics. 
Our review of the normative and empirical research is 
intended to be a step toward a more comprehensive the-
oretical basis for empirical study. 
Theoretical incompleteness may also explain the ap-
parently inconsistent results found in two recent experi-
mental studies that are particularly relevant for our own 
work. In the fi rst study, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) 
present an empirical test of Rawls’ theory of justice by 
having participants in groups determine rules for distrib-
uting income they are to earn by doing an unspecifi ed task 
(behind a “veil of ignorance”). Their results show a strik-
ing consistency through different iterations and in differ-
ent settings, including cross-nationally (Frohlich and Op-
penheimer 1992, especially 60). Of the four alternative 
models among which groups choose, they fi nd that groups 
almost never choose a Rawlsian solution (1 percent), and 
relatively seldom do they choose either maximizing av-
erage income (12 percent) or maximizing effi ciency with 
an inequality (“range”) constraint (9 percent). Instead, 
groups overwhelmingly choose maximizing income after 
setting a minimum (“fl oor”) income (78 percent). They 
argue their results reveal that effi ciency and need (in our 
terminology) are the chief principles used in adopting fair 
income distributions. Their results are nonetheless open 
to different interpretations. The consistent adoption of a 
fl oor constraint may offer evidence that need is a distinct 
principle, but it might also be interpreted as evidence for 
a concern with inequality. While relatively few groups ex-
plicitly chose a range constraint, many chose a minimum 
income level that effectively narrowed the income range, 
especially since the minimum levels they adopted were in 
several cases well above real-world income levels (1992, 
82–94; cf. Lissowski and Swistak 1995). Likewise, while 
their fi nding that most groups maximized income may in-
dicate a concern with effi ciency, since they did not dis-
tinguish between effi ciency and merit in their design they 
cannot determine why groups allowed inequality when 
maximizing income. 
The second study by Mitchell et al. (1993) produc-
es results that seem to contradict Frohlich and Oppen-
heimer’s. They also examine behavior under a condition 
of impartiality, but rather than attempting to place indi-
viduals behind a “veil of ignorance,” they tell partici-
pants to assume they are being asked their opinion about 
policy options as advisors to a hypothetical society. 
They then have participants rank these policy options in 
the form of income distributions that pose tradeoffs be-
tween equality and effi ciency. Their major experimental 
manipulation is to vary information given to participants 
about the degree that merit explains income (10 percent, 
50 percent, or 90 percent), as opposed to luck, connec-
tions, and similar factors. Their results demonstrate that 
participants employ both equality and effi ciency and 
make tradeoffs between them. Their results further sug-
gest that equality-effi ciency preferences are mediated by 
assumptions about merit, with participants showing an 
increased preference for effi ciency and a decreased pref-
erence for equality as the degree of assumed merit in-
creases. They claim that the result of the merit manip-
ulation supports Rawls, since participants tend to pre-
fer equality over effi ciency when luck and other “moral-
ly arbitrary” factors overwhelmingly determine income. 
This result may confi rm that individuals act in a manner 
consistent with Rawls’ expectations when they believe 
that unequal income is not in itself merited, but their re-
sults otherwise contradict Rawls since considerations of 
merit clearly affected participants’ relative preference for 
equality in conditions where merit increasingly predicts 
income. Likewise, their claim that a signifi cant number 
of participants have behavior consistent with a Rawl-
sian maximin model is questionable because their a pri-
ori model specifi cation does not effectively distinguish 
egalitarian and Rawlsian solutions: if they had used rel-
ative equality as their measure for equality (i.e., the pro-
portion between the highest and lowest quartiles) rath-
er than the absolute measure they did employ (i.e., the 
absolute dollar difference between the highest and low-
est quartiles), then the rank ordering for the egalitarian 
model would be exactly the same as the Rawlsian mod-
el. Although the measurement of inequality is a complex 
and often highly technical subject (see Temkin 1993; 
Sen 1997), all major measures are proportional rather 
than absolute, and therefore we use a proportional mea-
sure in our own experiments. Finally, it is unclear from 
Mitchell et al.’s results whether need operates as a dis-
tinct allocation principle since they did not systematical-
ly vary need independent of equality. Subsequent work 
by two of the authors of their study points out this fl aw 
and suggests that participants are in fact infl uenced by 
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need (Ordóñez and Mellers 1993). We vary need inde-
pendent of equality. 
Our own research is intended in part to test the 
seemingly confl icting results of these two sets of exper-
iments. To summarize: whereas Frohlich and Oppen-
heimer (1992) fi nd virtually no support for either Raw-
lsian or egalitarian norms, and instead fi nd that partici-
pants overwhelmingly maximize effi ciency after setting 
a minimum level of need, Mitchell et al. (1993) argue 
their results show strong Rawlsian and egalitarian norms 
at work as well as a concern for effi ciency. Some of the 
differences in the fi ndings of these experiments are un-
doubtedly due to differences in experimental manipula-
tion. We further suggest that they are the result of an in-
complete experimental design that prevents either set of 
studies from analyzing all four allocation principles si-
multaneously. Our experimental design builds on that of 
Mitchell et al., but with signifi cant changes based on our 
review of the normative and experimental research. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND 
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
Experimental Design 
All three experiments in our study employ the same ba-
sic design. Participants read a short description of a hy-
pothetical society and are asked to imagine they are 
outside observers giving their advice to the society. 
To insure impartiality, they are explicitly told they are 
not members of this society. They are asked to evalu-
ate nine policy alternatives being considered by this so-
ciety based on the effects each would have on the lev-
el and distribution of income (see appendix for partici-
pant instructions). These policies are not described, but 
are presented in terms of their effect on income. After 
reading the country description, participants are given a 
short test to confi rm that the experimental manipulations 
were successful.1 We then present participants with a set 
of nine income distributions in randomized fashion. For 
each distribution a bar graph shows the average income 
for each quintile and information on the overall average 
income, the ratio of the incomes of the top and bottom 
quintiles (the “income inequality ratio”), and the pover-
ty line. Participants evaluate each distribution on a scale 
from 0 (“very bad”) to 10 (“very good”). The answers 
to these questions are used to create the dependent vari-
ables for statistical analyses. Finally, participants com-
plete a post-experimental questionnaire that provides the 
basis for the control variables.
Experimental Manipulations and 
Dependent Variables 
Within each experiment, we present all participants with 
the same set of nine income distributions. These nine al-
ternatives result from the manipulation of two within-
subject variables, each with three levels: effi ciency (low, 
medium, high) and equality (high, medium, low). Effi -
ciency is operationalized as average income and equal-
ity as the ratio of the income of the highest quintile to 
the lowest. Table 1 shows the general design used for all 
three experiments along with the income distributions 
used in Experiments 1 and 2. In all three experiments 
we vary effi ciency in three levels by increasing average 
income constantly from one level to the next: $32,000, 
$42,000, $55,000.2 We also vary equality across three 
levels in all the experiments. Varying equality and effi -
ciency in this way poses participants with a number of 
equality-effi ciency tradeoffs that we can use to deter-
mine their relative preferences for the two principles. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants face four equality-effi -
ciency tradeoffs, represented by the arrows along the di-
agonals in Table 1. For example, there is a tradeoff be-
tween the high equality/medium effi ciency distribution 
and the medium equality/high effi ciency one. Each trad-
eoff enables us to examine whether participants prefer 
greater income at the cost of lower equality or whether 
they prefer greater equality at the cost of lower income. 
We study the relationship between equality-effi cien-
cy preferences and the other two allocation principles, 
merit and need, through two variables manipulated be-
tween participants. The fi rst variable is designed to ex-
amine how equality and effi ciency preferences are af-
fected by assumptions about merit. As in Mitchell et 
al. (1993), we randomly vary what participants are told 
about the degree to which income is explained by effort 
and ability (10 percent, 50 percent, and 90 percent) as 
opposed to luck, connections, and similar factors. The 
second variable is designed to test whether need is a 
1 Participants who do not answer all these questions correctly or do not 
complete the experiment are not included in the fi nal data set. In order to 
insure that they have been successfully manipulated by the between-sub-
ject merit and need variables, the manipulation check includes questions 
on the degree to which income is determined by effort and ability and the 
level of the poverty line. It also contains questions to make sure that par-
ticipants can distinguish between more effi cient and more equal income 
distributions. 
2 When creating the income distributions we consulted U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau data in order to make the distributions plausible. In all of our 
experiments the middle effi ciency level is $42,000 for the average in-
come of a four-person family (our stipulated measure). The median in-
come (averaged for the two testing sites) for a four-person family for fi s-
cal year 1998 was $42,709. See http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/
4person.html .
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distinct allocation principle. We do so by manipulating 
what participants are told about the poverty line. In Ex-
periments 1 and 3, the poverty line is either $10,000 or 
$15,000.3 The poverty line manipulation affects the low 
equality distributions, or the bottom, shaded row in Ta-
ble 1. When the poverty line is stipulated as $10,000, all 
of the income quintiles in the three low equality income 
distributions are above the poverty line, but when the 
poverty line is stipulated as $15,000, the lowest income 
quintile in the three low equality income distributions is 
below the poverty line. 
We have developed two dependent variables to ob-
serve the relationships among the different allocation 
principles. The fi rst dependent variable is an equality-
effi ciency tradeoff score created by summing the differ-
ences between a participant’s ratings of the two distribu-
tions in each of the four diagonal tradeoffs indicated by 
the arrows in Table 1 (e.g., high equality/low effi ciency 
-medium equality/medium effi ciency). Preferences for 
equality result in positive scores, while preferences for 
effi ciency produce negative scores. The second depen-
dent variable is a need sensitivity score created by tak-
ing the sum of a participant’s ratings of the three dis-
tributions affected by the poverty manipulation, i.e., the 
three low equality distributions in the bottom, shaded 
row in Table 1. 
Participants were undergraduates at the University 
of Houston and Louisiana State University, all of whom 
were tested in Fall 1998. Participants from the Universi-
ty of Houston were tested in lower-level political science 
courses, while participants from Louisiana State Uni-
versity were recruited in lower-level psychology cours-
es and tested in small groups in a laboratory setting. No 
statistically signifi cant differences exist between the two 
sites or among testing groups, so we combine the data 
for all analyses. 
Theoretical Predictions 
Equality-effi ciency preferences. Our manipulation of 
equality and effi ciency levels in the income distributions 
is designed examine participants use and effi ciency as 
allocation principles, especially in relation to one anoth-
3 We consulted U.S. Census Bureau data when designing the pover-
ty manipulation, although we were constrained in setting our poverty line 
by its effect on the income distributions we adopted. The federally stip-
ulated poverty line for a four-person family was $16,400 in 1997. See 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld97.html.
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er. By varying equality and effi ciency levels, we can test 
whether effi ciency and equality are “normal goods,” in 
the economic sense of more being preferred to less. If 
equality functions as a normal good, then participants’ 
ratings of more equal income distributions will be higher 
than less equal distributions within each effi ciency level. 
Likewise, if effi ciency is a normal good, then they will 
prefer more effi cient distributions to less effi cient ones 
within each equality level. If, as we expect, most partici-
pants use both equality and effi ciency as allocation prin-
ciples, then the interesting question becomes how they 
make tradeoffs between them. 
We begin our analysis of participants’ equality-effi -
ciency tradeoffs by categorizing individual-level behav-
ior in accordance with three alternative theoretical mod-
els: (1) strict egalitarian; (2) strict effi ciency-maximi-
zation; (3) mixed. Strict egalitarians always prefer the 
more equal distribution to the less equal one in each of 
the four diagonal equality-effi ciency tradeoffs indicated 
by the arrows in Table 1. In contrast, strict effi ciency-
maximizers always prefer the more effi cient distribution 
to the less effi cient one in the same four tradeoffs. Final-
ly, participants who view both equality and effi ciency as 
normal goods will make tradeoffs between them, some-
times preferring more effi cient distributions and some-
times more equal distributions, depending upon their rel-
ative preferences for the two principles. We expect most 
participants to use both equality and effi ciency as allo-
cation principles, viewing both equality and effi ciency 
as normal goods and therefore making tradeoffs between 
them. We also expect they will use these two principles 
to different degrees, with some participants more con-
cerned with equality and others with effi ciency. These 
results would be consistent with Mitchell et al.’s (1993) 
fi ndings, but generally contrary to Frohlich and Oppen-
heimer’s (1992) results. 
While inspection of the raw data and comparison of 
participants’ behavior to these theoretical models pro-
vide us with considerable information, we will analyze 
equality-effi ciency preferences more closely by using 
the equality-effi ciency tradeoff score as the dependent 
variable in multivariate analyses. This variable allows us 
to examine the interaction of equality-effi ciency prefer-
ences with the independent merit and need variables in 
the presence of the control variables. 
Merit effects. The merit manipulation is designed to 
test whether equality and effi ciency preferences are me-
diated by assumptions about the degree to which income 
is explained by effort and ability, or “merited.” We ran-
domly divide the sample for each experiment into three 
groups that are given different information about the de-
gree to which income is merited: 10 percent, 50 percent, 
and 90 percent. The merit factor identifi es which group a 
participant falls into (10, 50, 90). We predict that partic-
ipants will be less concerned with equality as the degree 
to which income is merited increases. The merit factor 
should therefore have a negative effect on the equality-
effi ciency tradeoff variable. This result would be consis-
tent with Mitchell et al. (1993). We further expect that 
merit should have a negative effect on the need sensi-
tivity variable since participants will view those below 
the poverty line as increasingly “deservedly” poor. This 
fi nding would be consistent with the tradeoff Ordóñez 
and Mellers (1993) fi nd between need and merit. 
Need effects. The poverty-line manipulation is designed 
to determine whether need is a distinct allocation prin-
ciple. As noted above, the design used by Mitchell et al. 
(1993) makes it impossible to determine whether a pref-
erence for more egalitarian distributions is due to a con-
cern with equality or need. Our poverty-line manipu-
lation enables us to distinguish the two principles. We 
randomly divide our sample into two groups with dif-
ferent poverty lines: $10,000 (where no distributions are 
affected) and $15,000 (where the low equality distribu-
tions are affected). The poverty dummy variable iden-
tifi es which group a participant falls into (0 if the par-
ticipant is in the $10,000 group and 1 in the $15,000 
group). We expect that participants will give lower rat-
ings to distributions affected by the poverty manipula-
tion across merit conditions, with the poverty variable 
therefore having a negative effect on the need sensitivity 
variable. The distinctness of need as an allocation prin-
ciple would be consistent with several studies, including 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992; see also Alves and 
Rossi 1978; Mellers 1982; Ordóñez and Mellers 1993). 
We also expect the poverty line to have a weak effect on 
the equality-effi ciency tradeoff variable since a concern 
with need should affect two of the four equations that 
comprise the variable. 
Control variable effects. Our post-experimental ques-
tionnaire elicits information on demographic and polit-
ical values that provide measures for the control vari-
ables that other studies have suggested affect how indi-
viduals use allocation principles in making distributive 
justice judgments. A number of studies show differences 
in the justice beliefs of men and women. Women gener-
ally tend to prefer equality, while men tend to weigh effi -
ciency more heavily (Major and Deaux 1982; Major and 
Adams 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986, chapter 5). In ad-
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dition, women have been found to be more sensitive to 
poverty and need (Kluegel and Miyano 1995; Davidson, 
Steinmann, and Wegener 1995). We therefore predict 
that gender will have a negative effect on the equality-
effi ciency tradeoff and need sensitivity variables. 
Political ideology has also been found to affect 
distributive justice judgments, with liberals on aver-
age being more concerned with equality and conserva-
tives with effi ciency (Tetlock and Mitchell 1993; Mitch-
ell et al. 1993). Similarly, conservatives are less con-
cerned with need than liberals, especially as merit lev-
el increases (see Skitka and Tetlock 1992, 1993; Tetlock 
and Mitchell 1993). We therefore expect that ideology 
(based on a fi ve-point scale from conservative to liber-
al) will have a positive effect on the equality-effi ciency 
tradeoff variable and a negative effect on the need sensi-
tivity variable. 
While most studies suggest that lower SES individ-
uals in the United States generally endorse disparity in 
income based on beliefs in merit (Lane 1962, chapter 5; 
Hochshild 1981), a negative correlation has been found 
between SES and egalitarian beliefs (Lane 1962, chapter 
7; Davidson, Steinmann, and Wegener 1995), and a pos-
itive correlation has been found between high SES and 
merit beliefs (McClosky and Zaller 1984; Kluegel and 
Smith 1986). No experimental research has been done to 
test these fi ndings. 
Finally, we include a question designed to test the 
power of our experimental manipulation of merit. It is 
possible that the degree to which participants see in-
come as being deserved is not a function of the experi-
mental manipulation of merit level in a hypothetical so-
ciety, but rather their perceptions of our own society. To 
test for this possibility, we ask participants for their own 
perception of the degree to which income is merited in 
the United States (0–100 percent). If this independent 
merit perception variable is not signifi cant in our analy-
ses, then we can be confi dent that our results concerning 
the effect of merit on equality-effi ciency preferences are 
due to our experimental manipulation and not to individ-
uals’ independent perceptions. 
Results 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, the income distributions rated by par-
ticipants were created by manipulating effi ciency and 
equality independently. We increase, effi ciency constant-
ly across three levels ($32,000, $42,000, $55,000) and 
increase income inequality constantly across three levels 
(2.0, 3.5, 6.1). The income distributions used in Experi-
ment 1 are shown in Table 1 above. Table 2 reports the 
mean ratings for the income distributions for the three 
merit conditions and separated by the two poverty con-
ditions. There are 401 participants in Experiment 1 (242 
women and 159 men). 
Our expectation that participants would general-
ly treat both equality and effi ciency as normal goods is 
confi rmed by the mean ratings in Table 2. In every single 
case across all conditions participants on average prefer 
more equal to less equal distributions when effi ciency is 
held constant and more effi cient to less effi cient distri-
butions when equality is held constant. 
More interestingly, individual-level analysis of the 
ratings shows that participants are divided in their use of 
equality and effi ciency. Their differing use of principles 
can be seen by comparing participants’ observed behavior 
to the theoretical models outlined above. The strict egal-
itarian model fi ts the observed behavior of 26.2 percent 
of participants, while the strict effi ciency model fi ts the 
behavior of 7.7 percent of participants. Only one-third of 
participants are therefore strongly oriented toward either 
equality or effi ciency, while the other two-thirds fi t the 
mixed model, using both equality and effi ciency as allo-
cation principles and making tradeoffs between them. 
Experiment 1 initially seems to confi rm that partic-
ipants’ equality-effi ciency preferences are mediated by 
their merit assumptions. First, simply using visual in-
spection of the mean ratings and focusing on the diago-
nal tradeoffs, as Mitchell et al. (1993) do, we see an ap-
parent shift in preferences in the aggregate results. The 
direction of the absolute preferences in the four diagonal 
tradeoffs are shown by arrows superimposed over the 
mean ratings in Table 2, with arrows pointing in a single 
direction indicating a statistically signifi cant difference 
(two-tailed test; p < .05). Inspection reveals that equali-
ty-effi ciency preferences change in the direction of pre-
ferring more effi ciency as merit increases. When merit 
is set at 10 percent, seven of the eight tradeoffs show 
a clear preference for more equality, while when mer-
it is set at 90 percent there is an even split with partici-
pants on average preferring greater effi ciency in four of 
the tradeoffs and greater equality in the other four. These 
results are consistent with Mitchell et al. (1993), but we 
have developed more precise measures to explore these 
apparent preference changes more fully. 
We analyze equality-effi ciency preferences using 
the equality-effi ciency tradeoff score described above. 
Equality-effi ciency tradeoff scores ranged from +24 (out 
of a possible +30), for the participant with the most ex-
treme preference for equality, to –28 (out of a possible 
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–30), for the participant with the most extreme prefer-
ence for effi ciency (x = +3.4, sd = 8.8). The two inde-
pendent variables of greatest interest are merit level and 
poverty level. Political ideology, mother’s education 
(our measure of SES),4 sex, and the participant’s inde-
pendent merit perception are used as control variables5 
Table 3a presents the results of regressing these factors 
on the equality-effi ciency tradeoff score. 
The aggregate results reported in Table 3a (column 
1) show merit level has a strong effect on equality pref-
erences in the expected direction. As the degree to which 
income is explained by effort and ability increases, par-
ticipants clearly become less concerned with equality. 
The poverty variable does not appear to have an effect, 
but we will examine the poverty line manipulation mo-
mentarily. As for the control variables, sex has a large ef-
fect. Women show a much stronger preference for equal-
ity than men. Furthermore, SES has an effect, with par-
ticipants from higher-SES families tending to emphasize 
effi ciency. Finally, that independent merit perception is 
not statistically signifi cant suggests that participants’ be-
havior is explained by our experimental manipulation of 
merit rather than their own preconceptions.6 
The gender difference we found on the aggregate 
level is particularly striking, and we therefore divided 
the sample into women and men and reran the regres-
sions on these separate samples. Table 3a (columns 2 
and 3) shows the results for women and men. We fi nd 
that a surprisingly large difference in the way men and 
women respond to the experimental stimuli underlies the 
aggregate results. First, the signifi cant effect of the merit 
manipulation seen in the aggregate results was driven by 
women, who react strongly to the change in merit while 
men do not. Second, while ideology does not have an ef-
fect on the aggregate level, dividing the sample reveals 
a strong effect for men but no effect for women. Among 
men, liberals tend to be more egalitarian while conser-
vatives are more concerned with effi ciency. As for SES, 
men are somewhat more strongly affected by SES, with 
higher-SES participants more concerned with effi ciency. 
The effect of SES for women is in the same direction as 
for men, although the variable is not statistically signifi -
cant. Finally, participants’ independent merit perception 
is not signifi cant for either women or men. 
We analyze the distinctness of need by examining 
the effect of poverty manipulation on participants’ rat-
ings of the income distributions affected by the manip-
ulation. We use the need sensitivity score as the depen-
6 Independent merit perceptions in Experiment 1 varied from 5 per-
cent to 100 percent, with a mean of 61.7 (sd = 19.8). Results for Exper-
iments 2 and 3 were very similar. For Experiment 2, they varied from 
0 percent to 100 percent, with a mean of 64.6 (sd = 17.5). For Experi-
ment 3, they varied from 0 percent to 100 percent, with a mean of 62.2 
(sd= 20.7).
4 We tested four different measures of SES: mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, family income, and a factor created using all three ele-
ments. All four measures provide consistent effects. We chose mother’s 
education as the control variable because we have more complete data on 
this variable. 
5 We ran regression models for all analyses that included measures 
for party identifi cation, race, and age. None of these other variables had 
any statistically signifi cant effect or had any substantial infl uence on the 
statistically signifi cant variables, and so we report only results of the re-
duced regression equation. 
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dent variable and the same independent variables as in 
the regression analyses of equality-effi ciency prefer-
ences.7 The results of the analyses of need are reported 
in Table 3b. The aggregate results (column 1) show the 
poverty factor has an effect in the expected difference, 
but it is not statistically signifi cant. The only statistical-
ly signifi cant variables are merit and sex. Women give 
lower ratings to the low equality distributions than men 
regardless of the poverty line. As with the previous anal-
yses, we split the sample by gender and reran the anal-
ysis. When we look at the results for women alone (col-
umn 2), we see some support for the distinctness of need 
from the marginal statistical signifi cance of the poverty 
manipulation. Women’s concern with need is also medi-
ated by the merit manipulation, with women being less 
concerned about need as the degree to which merit ex-
plains income increases. In turn, men (column 3) do not 
appear to use need as a distinct allocation principle, and 
none of the variables tested predict men’s need sensitiv-
ity. 
While we were surprised that the poverty manipula-
tion did not have a stronger impact, we suspect that this 
result may be due in part to a serious fl oor effect. Scores 
for the low equality distributions were already so low on 
average that the added poverty condition had only a lim-
ited effect. For example, where the poverty line was set 
at $10,000,33 percent of participants gave the low equal-
ity/low effi ciency distribution a rating of 0 and 21 per-
cent gave it a rating of 1. We further believe that our de-
sign of the income distributions in Experiment 1 did not 
suffi ciently distinguish need from inequality since the 
three income distributions affected by the poverty line 
manipulation were also the lowest equality level distri-
butions. We therefore believe that the concern for low 
equality in those distributions masked any distinct sen-
sitivity to need. In order to test this conjecture, we did a 
follow-up experiment, Experiment 2. 
7 In running regression diagnostics, we found heteroskedasticity 
across the error terms of the standard OLS regression. We therefore re-
port robust standard error estimators using the Huber-White correction. 
We also ran the analyses using a negative binomial regression. Even 
though the dependent variable is not, strictly speaking, an event count, 
the shape of the underlying distribution conforms to a negative binomial. 
The results in terms of the signifi cance of the independent variables are 
the same no matter which method we use (standard OLS, OLS with ro-
bust standard error estimators, or negative binomial regression). 
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Experiment 2 
For Experiment 2 we use the same design and distributions 
as Experiment 1 (see Table l), but with the poverty line 
stipulated as $20,000. In addition to the three distributions 
in the low equality level, as in Experiment 1, raising the 
poverty line to $20,000 affects the two distributions with 
low and medium effi ciency levels in the medium-equali-
ty row, placing the bottom quintile of these distributions 
below the poverty line. Because the level of inequality of 
these distributions is modest, we believe this to be a bet-
ter test of the poverty line manipulation as it avoids con-
founding concern for inequality with sensitivity to need, 
as we suspect occurred in Experiment 1. We expect that 
the mean ratings for these two distributions will be signif-
icantly lower in the $20,000 poverty condition than in the 
$10,000 and $15,000. Experiment 2 includes 136 partici-
pants (eighty-fi ve women and fi fty-one men). 
To analyze the effect of the poverty manipulation 
in Experiment 2, we use a modifi ed need sensitivity in-
dex that creates a score for each participant by summing 
the ratings of the two distributions in the medium equal-
ity level affected by the poverty manipulation. We then 
use the modifi ed need sensitivity score as the dependent 
variable and control for the same variables as in the pre-
vious analyses, combining the $20,000 poverty condi-
tion cases of Experiment 2 (poverty variable coded 1) 
and the $10,000 and $15,000 conditions from Experi-
ment 1 (poverty variable coded 0). 
The results for Experiment 2 using the modifi ed 
need sensitivity score show more support than Experi-
ment 1 for the existence of need as a distinct allocation 
principle. On the aggregate level the poverty factor is a 
highly statistically signifi cant predictor of participants’ 
need sensitivity (b = –1.03*** (.25)). As with Experi-
ment 1, merit is a relatively strong predictor (b = .012** 
(.005)), with participants less concerned with need as 
merit level increased. When we separate the sample into 
women and men, as in the previous analyses, we see 
the same gender difference as in the previous experi-
ment. For women, the poverty factor is strongly statis-
tically signifi cant (b = -1.48*** (.41)). The merit factor 
is also a statistically signifi cant predictor for women (b 
= .015** (.006)), as is ideology (b = -.49** (.25)), with 
liberals being somewhat more concerned with poverty 
than conservatives. As for men, the poverty factor is not 
statistically signifi cant in predicting need sensitivity, nor 
is any other variable.8
In sum, Experiment 2 suggests need is a distinct al-
location principle for at least some participants and that 
women are considerably more sensitive to need than 
men. It also seems to confi rm our conjecture from the 
results of Experiment 1, that need and equality are often 
diffi cult to distinguish in practice although they are con-
ceptually distinct. One of the purposes of Experiment 3 
is to clearly distinguish need and equality to see whether 
the principles function independently. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 is designed to explore equality-effi ciency 
preferences in greater detail, as well as to confi rm the re-
sults of Experiments 1 and 2 under different conditions. 
The equality-effi ciency tradeoffs in Experiment 1 were 
limited to the four diagonal cases between two constant 
equality levels. Our analysis of individual-level behavior 
in Experiment 1 likely overstated the number of effi cien-
cy-maximizers and egalitarians, and therefore underesti-
mated the number of participants who use both princi-
ples. In Experiment 3 we create more tradeoff situations 
to refi ne our analysis of participants’ use of equality and 
effi ciency as allocation principles. This change in design 
will also alter the effect of the poverty manipulation on 
the low equality income distributions, making the issue 
of need more distinct than in the earlier experiments. 
As in the previous experiments, we increase effi -
ciency using the same three constant levels ($32,000, 
$42,000, $55,000). While we use three equality levels as 
the earlier experiments, rather than keeping equality con-
stant we decrease equality from distribution to distribu-
tion across effi ciency levels in approximately equal (ab-
solute) steps within each equality level. This variation of 
equality means that participants are posed with two hor-
izontal equality-effi ciency tradeoffs within each equality 
level (e.g., high equality/medium effi ciency versus high 
equality/high effi ciency), or six horizontal tradeoffs in 
all, in addition to the four diagonal tradeoffs created in 
the earlier experiments. Table 4 shows the income dis-
tributions used in Experiment 3. Experiment 3 included 
460 participants (290 women and 170 men). 
Individual-level analysis of participants’ behavior 
confi rms our conjecture that more participants than was 
apparent in Experiment 1 use both equality and effi cien-
cy as allocation principles and make tradeoffs between 
them. As noted above, the design of Experiment 3 permits 
stricter theoretical models than Experiment 1, where we 
8 These results use a two-tailed test, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < 
,001, with standard errors in parentheses. Regression diagnostics re-
vealed no heteroskedasticity so we use OLS standard errors. Testing for 
the effect of the $20,000 poverty line on the three low-equality distribu-
tions, we found no signifi cant effect when comparing the $10,000 pover-
ty line sample from Experiment 1 and those at the $20,000 poverty line 
in Experiment 2. These results heighten our suspicion that the failure of 
the poverty manipulation in Experiment 1 was caused by a fl oor effect. 
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could analyze only the diagonal tradeoffs between equal-
ity and effi ciency. A strict egalitarian model further re-
stricts the earlier egalitarian model by adding to the con-
dition that a participant must prefer the more equal to the 
less equal distribution in each of the four diagonal trad-
eoffs the further stipulation that a participant must have 
an equal or great preference for the more equal to less 
equal distribution in all of the horizontal tradeoffs. Only 
9.7 percent of participants fi t this model. A strict effi cien-
cy model further restricts the earlier effi ciency model by 
adding to the condition that a participant must prefer the 
more effi cient to the less effi cient distribution in each of 
the four diagonal tradeoffs the further stipulation that a 
participant must have an equal or greater preference the 
more effi cient to less effi cient distribution in all of the 
horizontal tradeoffs. Only 6.3 percent of participants fi t 
this model. (Examining participants’ behavior using the 
less strict models used to analyze Experiment 1 reveals 
similar results as the earlier experiment: 36.4 percent of 
participants have observed behavior fi tting the egalitari-
an model and 8.2 percent fi tting the effi ciency-maximi-
zation model.) The vast majority of participants therefore 
use both equality and effi ciency as allocation principles 
and make tradeoffs between them. 
Visual inspection of the mean ratings for the in-
come distributions for Experiment 3 across merit condi-
tions and separated by poverty conditions (Table 5) re-
veals results generally similar to those in Experiment 1. 
First, participants on average view both equality and ef-
fi ciency as normal goods. Second, there appears to be a 
change in absolute and relative preferences for equality 
and effi ciency across merit conditions, with participants 
on average being less concerned with equality as mer-
it level increases. Once again, however, closer analy-
sis of these results confi rms the results from Experiment 
1, including the underlying difference between the be-
havior of women and men. We examine these preferenc-
es using the same equality-effi ciency tradeoff score and 
regression equations as in Experiment 1. Equality-effi -
ciency tradeoff scores ranged from +25, for the partici-
pant with the most extreme preference for equality, to –
22, for the participant with the most extreme preference 
for effi ciency (x = +5.4, sd = 10.0). 
We see at the aggregate level (Table 6a, column 1) 
that merit once again has a strong effect on equality-ef-
fi ciency preferences in the expected direction, with par-
ticipants less concerned with equality as merit level in-
creases. Unlike Experiment 1, the poverty condition has 
a strong effect on equality-effi ciency preferences, sug-
gesting an independent effect of the poverty manipula-
tion. The effect of the control variables in Experiment 
3 is broadly consistent with the earlier experiment. Sex 
once again has a large effect, with women showing a 
stronger preference for equality than men. Also impor-
tant is ideology, with liberals somewhat more concerned 
with equality than conservatives. SES did not have any 
signifi cant effect on equality-effi ciency preferences. Fi-
nally, as in Experiment 1, participants’ independent mer-
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it perception is not a signifi cant predictor, further con-
fi rming that their behavior is explained by our experi-
mental manipulation. 
The surprisingly strong difference in behavior of 
women and men that we found in our analysis of equal-
ity-effi ciency preferences in Experiment 1 is confi rmed 
in Experiment 3. As with the earlier experiment, we di-
vided the sample into women and men and reran the re-
gressions (Table 6a, columns 2 and 3). The strong ef-
fect of the merit manipulation on the aggregate level is 
once again explained by the behavior of women alone, 
with women being less concerned with equality as mer-
it level increases. The poverty condition has an indepen-
dent effect on women’s equality-effi ciency preferences, 
but none of the other variables do. As for men, as in Ex-
periment 1, the merit manipulation had no signifi cant ef-
fect on their equality-effi ciency preferences. Ideology is 
the only control variable that has a statistically signifi -
cant effect, with liberal men more sensitive to need than 
conservative ones. Unlike Experiment 1, however, the 
poverty manipulation is weakly signifi cant for men (p < 
.08), suggesting the poverty manipulation has an effect 
in Experiment 3 for both women and men. 
Our expectation that need is a distinct allocation 
principle is affi rmed in Experiment 3. To analyze the ef-
fect of the poverty manipulation, we use the same need 
sensitivity score and regression equations as in Exper-
iment 1. First, on the aggregate level (Table 6b, col-
umn 1) we see that the poverty manipulation was suc-
cessful, as revealed in the strength of the poverty condi-
tion variable on need sensitivity. The merit condition is 
also moderately important, with participants on average 
less sensitive to poverty as the degree to which income 
is merited increases. For women (column 2), the pover-
ty condition is a strong predictor of need sensitivity, as 
in the previous experiments. Also important is the mer-
it condition, with women’s concern for need weakening 
when income is thought to be increasingly merited. For 
men (column 3) the poverty condition is also a signifi -
cant predictor of need sensitivity, unlike in the previous 
experiments. So, too, is ideology, with liberal men more 
concerned with need than conservative ones. These re-
sults, combined with those from Experiment 2, provide 
us with considerable evidence that need is a distinct al-
location principle. 
DISCUSSION 
We wish to summarize our fi ndings and discuss how our 
results concerning gender in particular relate to research 
on the gender gap in other areas of political inquiry. Be-
fore discussing our results, however, we should address 
the possible limits to their generalizability. Like most ex-
perimental research, we used a convenience sample of 
undergraduates, raising legitimate questions about ex-
ternal validity (see Sears 1986). We did make our sub-
ject pool as diverse as possible, partly through using an 
unusually large sample and partly through our choice of 
test site. One of our test sites, the University of Houston, 
is quite diverse (over 50 percent minority students). We 
nonetheless cannot claim to have a representative sam-
ple. Most notably, our subject pool is heavily skewed in 
terms of age. Based on national survey data, we know 
that younger respondents are more oriented toward equal-
ity, and so it is quite plausible that a more representative 
sample would show participants less oriented to equality 
than our results suggest. Whatever the limits of external 
validity, however, our fi rst concern was internal validity. 
Our primary aim was to examine the relationship among 
allocation principles and to see how they changed when 
we manipulated theoretically relevant conditions. By ma-
nipulating crucial variables between participants, we are 
able to test these principles without alerting participants 
to our interest in these questions. We included a rigorous 
manipulation check to guarantee that only participants 
who received the experimental treatment were included. 
Likewise, by asking participants in the post-experimental 
questionnaire about their own perceptions of the relation-
ship between merit and income, and then entering that in-
formation as an independent variable in our analyses, we 
are able to determine that our experimental manipulations 
rather than participants’ pre-existing perceptions explain 
our results. This test shows how using multiple regression 
analysis to enter additional controls can strengthen exper-
imental research. The success of these safeguards com-
bined with the inherent strengths of experimental research 
(see Kinder and Palfry 1993) make us confi dent that we 
have strong internal validity and that further research to 
confi rm and extend our results would be fruitful. 
Allocation Principles in Distributive 
Justice Judgments 
We found that all of the allocation principles we study—
equality, effi ciency, merit, and need—play a distinct role 
in distributive justice judgments. We also found that most 
individuals use all or most of these principles simultane-
ously in making judgments rather than applying differ-
ent norms in separate “spheres.” Finally, we observed 
that individual characteristics infl uence how they weigh 
these principles. Most strikingly, we found an unexpect-
edly strong sex difference in the use of these principles. 
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Equality. Equality performed as a normal good with par-
ticipants overwhelmingly preferring more equality over 
less while holding effi ciency constant. Furthermore, the 
general trend of participants shows a strong desire for 
equality even at the cost of a considerable loss in effi -
ciency. This fi nding strongly reaffi rms Mitchell et al.’s 
(1993) results and suggests that equality plays a stronger 
role than Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) found. 
Effi ciency. Effi ciency also performed as a normal good, 
more was consistently and overwhelmingly preferred to 
less, when holding other factors constant. We found in-
dividuals use both equality and effi ciency as allocation 
principles and make tradeoffs between them. Our re-
sults accord with Okun’s (1975) infl uential framework 
for public policy analysis. Our fi ndings concerning the 
factors infl uencing individuals’ equality and effi ciency 
preferences partially confi rm previous research, but also 
suggest a more complex picture than earlier studies, es-
pecially concerning sex. 
Merit. Our aggregate-level results initially appeared 
to suggest that all individuals are less concerned with 
equality as the degree to which income is merited in-
creases, confi rming the results of Mitchell et al.’s (1993) 
study. Upon closer inspection, however, we discov-
ered the results were driven entirely by women. Men’s 
equality-effi ciency preferences were not infl uenced by 
merit assumptions, but instead by ideology, which was 
not a statistically signifi cant predictor for women. Our 
fi ndings arguably support both sides of the debate over 
whether merit is a valid moral allocation principle, but 
that support is unexpectedly divided along gender lines 
that philosophers—and many empirical researchers—do 
not usually consider. 
Need. One of our principal aims was to determine wheth-
er need is a distinct allocation principle. We found that 
need is a distinct principle, but we also saw that sensitiv-
ity to need can be diffi cult to distinguish from a concern 
about inequality. Need can be defi ned either absolutely, 
as we did, or relatively. Defi ned relatively, sensitivity to 
need is diffi cult to distinguish from concern for inequal-
ity or relative deprivation. Participants in our study con-
sistently exhibited a low preference for low-equality dis-
tributions, and much of their need sensitivity seems to 
have been obscured by their concern for inequality. Only 
when we suffi ciently distinguished need and inequali-
ty in our experimental design did we fi nd a consistent-
ly distinct concern for need. We found that women are 
more sensitive to need than men, consistent with earli-
er research, but we also found that concern for need was 
mediated by merit assumptions among women alone. 
Also consistent with earlier research, we found some ev-
idence that political ideology infl uences need sensitivity, 
with conservatives on average less concerned with need 
than liberals. 
Finally, before turning to socio-psychological and 
other explanations for the gender differences we have 
found, we must consider the possibility that our results 
are due in part to the specifi c tradeoffs used in our ex-
perimental design. While the infl uence of merit assump-
tions on equality-effi ciency preferences was not statis-
tically signifi cant for men, the direction of the change 
in those preferences was consistent with the statistically 
signifi cant change in women’s preferences. We may not 
have been able to see the infl uence of merit on equal-
ity-effi ciency preferences among men because of the 
range of equality and effi ciency levels we used in our 
design. An altered design that increased the cost of trad-
ing off equality for effi ciency might reveal the infl uence 
of merit assumptions among men where their preference 
for marginal increases in effi ciency was weaker. That we 
found such clear gender differences, and the fact that the 
differences we found were not inconsistent with previ-
ous fi ndings in justice research, nonetheless suggests we 
must entertain other explanations. 
The Gender Gap in Distributive 
Justice Judgments 
Certainly our most surprising and potentially most inter-
esting results regard differences in how women and men 
use allocation principles in distributive justice judg-
ments. Based on earlier research, we expected to see dif-
ferences between women and men concerning their rel-
ative preferences for equality and effi ciency and their 
sensitivity to need. We did see such results, but we also 
discovered gender differences that went well beyond 
these ,relative preferences. In particular, we found un-
expected gender-specifi c interactions of merit with the 
other allocation principles. We saw that women’s equal-
ity-preferences were mediated by merit assumptions, 
but that men’s were not. These fi ndings are in some ten-
sion with other research on gender differences regard-
ing merit beliefs. For example, Major, Bylsma, and Coz-
zarelli (1989) fi nd in work domains men tend to distrib-
ute rewards using merit while women emphasize equal-
ity (see also Major and Adams 1983). While suggestive, 
our studies differ suffi ciently to make it diffi cult to draw 
any strong conclusions regarding the compatibility of 
results. Likewise, we found that women’s sensitivity to 
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need was mediated by merit assumptions whereas men’s 
were unaffected. Our research was not designed to ex-
plore these effects since we did not anticipate these gen-
der-specifi c interactions. Nor does previous justice re-
search offer guidance in interpreting the results. We can 
nonetheless consider several explanations that have been 
offered for gender gaps observed in political and policy 
preferences. 
Two leading theories have been advanced for gen-
der differences found in political, social, and moral be-
havior and attitudes. The fi rst is gender socialization, the 
best known version of which is Gilligan’s (1982) “dif-
ferent voice” theory. She argues that women emphasize 
an ethic of “care and connection” while men tend to em-
brace an “ethic of rights” that stresses individualism. On 
the one hand, our fi nding that women are more sensitive 
to need than men generally accords with her position. 
On the other hand, our results concerning merit seem to 
run contrary to her theory since, based on what she does 
argue, one would probably expect men and not women 
to distribute according to merit. The fact that women’s 
equality-effi ciency preferences were mediated by merit 
assumptions, however, suggests a sensitivity to context 
in moral reasoning that Gilligan argues is more typical 
of women. 
The other leading explanation for gender differ-
ences emphasizes structural or situational differenc-
es between women and men in society. This explana-
tion points to women’s traditional socioeconomic posi-
tion and suggests their tendency to weigh social welfare 
issues more heavily than men is the result of their vul-
nerability relative to men (e.g., Piven 1985). In terms of 
our experiment, women’s socioeconomic position might 
explain why they weigh need and equality more heav-
ily than men. While this theory may explain the inter-
cept effects we fi nd, it does not explain the interaction 
effects we fi nd between gender and the use of these prin-
ciples in relation to merit assumptions. Gender social-
ization and socioeconomic theories require further test-
ing before the underlying reason for such gender differ-
ences is clear. 
Recent research into the gender gap observed in po-
litical and policy preferences over the past two decades 
provides somewhat more guidance in interpreting our 
own fi ndings. There are two basic approaches to ex-
plaining the gender gap in voting and party preferenc-
es. The fi rst approach focuses on attitude differences, ar-
guing that the gender gap stems from underlying differ-
ences in political attitudes that are politicized in simi-
lar ways. The second approach emphasizes possible dif-
ferences in how women and men weigh certain issues, 
suggesting that the gender gap is explained better by dif-
ferent levels of salience of political issues for women 
and men. Both approaches have received some empir-
ical support (see Kaufman and Petrocik 1999), but the 
second approach is more relevant to our research since 
we also fi nd basic differences in how women and men 
weigh allocation principles. Early studies of the different 
weights that women and men assign to political issues 
found that men tend to weigh military issues more heav-
ily and that women tend to give greater weight to social 
issues (Gilens 1988; see Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). 
Our results are generally in line with these fi ndings, in-
sofar as we observe women being more sensitive to need 
and equality, which are principles analogous to the so-
cial issues examined in the gender gap research. Perhaps 
more suggestive, research into gender differences in eco-
nomic policy preferences has suggested that women tend 
to vote more sociotropically and men more egoistically 
(Welch and Hibbing 1992; Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 
1998). This fi nding may be analogous to the difference 
we fi nd between women and men concerning the inter-
action between merit and equality-effi ciency preferenc-
es. Interpreted in this light, women in our study were be-
having more sociotropically, reacting to the information 
about the degree to which merit is said to predict income 
in society as a whole, and men were behaving more ego-
istically, with their equality-effi ciency preferences deter-
mined by their individual ideological beliefs. This paral-
lel is weakened by the fact that our study examined im-
partial, and not self-interested, judgments and preferenc-
es. The difference in how women and men reason about 
distributive justice that we found nonetheless parallels-
and may even underlie-the gender gap seen in political 
and policy preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
We have found that distributive justice norms are com-
plex yet structured. The fact that individuals use sever-
al distinct allocation principles simultaneously in dis-
tributive decisions makes their behavior necessarily 
complex. This complexity is nonetheless comprehen-
sible, both because the underlying theoretical relation-
ship among these allocation principles is structured and 
because the independent factors that infl uence how in-
dividuals use these principles are predictable. The gen-
der difference we fi nd in how individuals use and weigh 
allocation principles in particular raises new questions 
for justice research to explore. The theoretical relation-
ships we fi nd among allocation principles should be of 
interest to political and moral theorists, and our empir-
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ical fi ndings should be considered when thinking about 
the philosophical validity of justice theories as well as 
their practical application. Our fi ndings also provide a 
grounding for more theoretically informed empirical in-
vestigations of political attitudes and behavior. If we 
are interested in individuals’ opinions on the distribu-
tion of society’s benefi ts and burdens, we need appropri-
ate stimuli for eliciting meaningful responses and under-
standing their views in their full complexity. In making 
political, social, and moral decisions women and men 
are concerned in part with justice, and our research is a 




Portions printed in italics are varied between-subject. The fi rst 
selection specifi es the degree to which income is explained 
by effort and ability (10 percent, 5’0 percent, 90 percent), 
while the other selections specify the level of the poverty line 
($10,000 and $15,000).
Assessment of Income Distributions
Please read the description below. Please ask if you have any 
questions at any time.
Imagine that you are an outside advisor to the country de-
scribed below. You are not a member of the country. You are 
being asked to give your opinion on what policies would be 
best for the country. We are interested in your ideas about how 
income should be distributed when your own interests are not 
at stake.
Country D is a self-governed society made up of people 
of a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. There is a broad 
variety of occupations in the society. Scientifi c studies have 
demonstrated that the amount of income a person receives in 
Country D is due almost entirely to the person’s effort and 
ability. People who are willing to work hard, take some risks, 
and acquire the proper education and skills have a very good 
chance of having a higher income. On the other hand, peo-
ple who are not willing to do these things have a very good 
chance of having a lower income. The amount of income a 
person receives is 90% due to his or her effort and ability, and 
only 10% due to luck, connections, and similar factors.
The people of Country D are considering a number of 
policies for their society. Economic studies have demonstrated 
what effects the different policies will have on the average in-
come in the country as a whole and on differences in people’s 
income (income distribution). Backers of the different policies 
are convinced by these studies and do not disagree about the 
effects of the policies. They do disagree on which policy is 
the best for their country. Among other considerations, certain 
analysts are more concerned about the average income, while 
others are more concerned about equality of income.
You are being asked to give your opinion about how 
good the different policies would be for Country D based on 
their effects on income.
In order to evaluate these different policies, you will be 
presented with charts that show their effects on income. The 
charts show family incomes broken down into each quintile 
(20 percent) of families, from the poorest 20 percent of fam-
ilies up to the wealthiest 20 percent. The charts also give you 
information about:
•  the average income in the country as a whole;
•  the poverty line (the amount of income needed to pro-
vide for the basic needs of food, housing, clothing, and 
medical care for a four-person family). The poverty 
line in Country D is $15,000.
•  the income inequality ratio, a commonly used measure 
of income inequality. The ratio tells you how many 
times greater the income of the wealthiest 20 percent 
of families is compared to the poorest 20 percent of 
families. For example, if the wealthiest 20 percent earn 
$100,000 and the poorest 20 percent earn $20,000, 
then the wealthiest 20 percent earn 5.0 times more in-
come than the poorest 20 percent, making the income 
inequality ratio 5.0. The .higher the income inequality 
ratio, the more unequal incomes are; the lower the in-
come inequality ratio, the more equal incomes are.
All the income fi gures are for after tax income for four-
person families. All income fi gures are in U.S. dollar equiv-
alents. 
The chart below shows what effects a hypothetical plan, 
Plan Z, would have on income for Country D. Average family 
incomes after taxes are: $18,000 per year for the poorest .20 
percent of families, $26,000 for the next 20 percent, $34,000 
for the next 20 percent, $50,000 for the next 20 percent, and 
$72,000 for the wealthiest 20 percent. The average family in-
come for the country as a whole is $40,000. The poverty line 
is $15,000. The income inequality ratio is 4.0.
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